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DAVIS, et al.

v.
SCHERER

CA 11
Johnson, Hatchett)

Federal/Civil

.."'

'

Timely

'
''

1.

SUMMARY:

Appts contend that the DC wrongly denied

them good faith immunity on the basis of their violation of state
,,
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regulations and declared unconstitutional a statute whose validity was not placed in issue by this suit.
2.

FACTS AND DECISION BELOW:

Appee worked as a radio

operator for the Florida Highway Patrol (FHP).

He decided to

supplement his income by working as well for the Escambia County
Sheriff's Office.

He applied for permission to do so, which was

granted by a memorandum which specifying that the permission
could be rescinded should the employment interfere with appee's
duties in the Patrol.
Shortly thereafter, permission was rescinded, and appee
was ordered to quit his second job.

Officers in the FHP central

headquarters apparently felt that appee might be subpoenaed in
the connection with his duties for the sheriff's office, thus
interfering with his duties at the Patrol.

Appee's immediate

superiors did not explain this reason to him.

He refused to quit

the second job, explaining that he had already invested in uniforms and a pistol for the sheriff's job and that he saw no conflict between the two jobs.

The exchanges between appee and his

superiors were embodied in a series of letters which were referred to one of appts, director of the FHP.

He ordered appee's

~mployment terminated.
Appee appealed his dismissal to the Florida Career Service Commission, claiming that his dismissal was without

jus~

cause not pursuant to a rule validly adopted by the department.
Five months later, appee filed a second petition challenging the
FHP policy on dual employment.
cy invalid as applied to appee.

The Commission declared the poliThe Commission then informed

page 3.
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petr that his appeal would be heard, ten months after the dismissal.

Before the hearing, the department and appee agreed that

appee would be reinstated and receive partial backpay.

month~

Six

resigned, claiming that he had been harrassed after

~

returning to work.
Appee then filed a section 1983 action in DC, contending
that his discharge violated the fourteenth amendment and requesting additional backpay, compensatory and exemplary damages, and a
declaraton that Florida's statute governing pre- and posttermination hearings was unconstitutional.
The DC entered judgment for appee.

It concluded that

under Florida law appee had a property interest in his job pro- ~
tected by the fourteenth amendment.

The court found that petr

had received no pretermination hearing:

hjl had

been given no

explanation of the reasons for termination and no opportunity
prior to termination to dispute whether his outside employment
conflicted with his duties at the FHP or constituted adequate
cause for dismissal.

Nor did appee receive a post-deprivation

hearing sufficiently prompt to remedy the failure to provide a
pre-termination hearing.
Further, the DC found unconstitutional section 110.061,
~

Florida Statutes (1977), because the statue contained no requireA

ment for a pretermination hearing or for a sufficiently prompt
post-termination hearing.
Finally, the DC rejected appts' qualified immunity defense.

The court found that appts had violated appee's clearly

7
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established constitutional rights.

u.s.

See Wood v. Strickland, 420

308, 322 (1975).
On rehearing, the DC found that at the time of appee's

discharge it was not clearly established that Florida state employees had a property interest in their job.

However, the DC

noted that appts had violated the FHP personnel rules, which require a written report, including a written statement from the
employee and a statement of reasons for discharge, before termination of employment. The court concluded that violation of clear
state law was sufficient to deprive appts of immunity.

Williams

v. Treen, 671 F.2d 892 (5th Cir. 1982).
The DC also noted on rehearing that Florida had amended
Chapter 110 to provide constitutionally sufficient pretermination procedures.

----

It therefore modified its order to in-

validate Chapter 110 and its implementing rules "insofar as they
fail to provide a prompt post-termination hearing."
The CA
3.

affirme~~~t~of

CONTENTIONS:

the DC opinion.

(1) The DC lacked jurisdiction to de-

clare the Florida statute unconstitutional.

Chapter 110 as it

currently stands had not even been promulgated at the time appee
was discharged, and so was not applied to appee.

The DC should

have upheld the statute by construing it to require a hearing in
a reasonable time.

In any case, the DC decision leaves the Flor-

ida Career Service Commission in confusion because the opinion
does not specify how promptly hearings must be held to satisfy
the Constitution.

No. 83-490
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The statute in effect at the time of appee's termination
was validly applied to appee.

A ninth month delay does not ren-

der the statute constitutionally infirm, because the delay does
not prevent the state from fully compensating wronged employees.
The case is thus distinguishable from Barry v. Barchi, 443

u.s.

55 (1979), where the delay worked irreparable harm on the aggrieved licensee.
(2) State officials do not lose qualified immunity upon
a showing that they violated clear state law, provided that they
acted with subjective good faith and did not violate clear federal constitutional principles.

The relevant decisions of this

court are framed in terms of whether the constitutional right

(

allegedly infringed was clearly established.
Navarette, 434

u.s.

308, 321-322 (1975).

E.g., Procunier v.

555, 562 (1977); Wood v. Strickland, 420

u.s.

The DC's reasoning is unsound because ex-

pansion of liability will chill officials' performance of their
lawful duties.

Further, the DC's holding creates incentives for

states to avoid formulating administrative rules to protect constitutional rights, because those rules will be a predicate for
liability even when the constitutional rights are unclear.
Resp: (1) Appee raises his challenge to the invalidation
of Chapter 110 for the first time before this Court.

Before the

CA, appee conceded that the wording of the new statute was "substantially the same" as that of the old.

Further, the delay of

ten months in the present case was clearly unreasonable.
(2) A state official who violates state law is stripped
of his qualified immunity.

The language of Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

page 6.
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(

102 S.Ct. 2727 (1982), refers broadly to violations of statutory
as well as constitutional law, and the holding below is consistent with prior CA cases.

Williams v. Treat, 671 F.2d 892, 901

(5th Cir. 1982); King v. Higgins, 702 F.2d 18, 21 (1st Cir.
1983).
Further, the DC's holding does not call into question
the validity of a state statute and so should not be considered
on appeal.
4.

DISCUSSION:

(1) The DC found that the Florida

statute had been amended to provide a constitutionally sufficient
pre-termination hearing.

On that basis, an additional prompt

post-termination might not be required.

The DC's declaratory

judgment dependea upon an evaluation of Florida employment procedures as a whole, and to that extent the controversy became moot
when Florida amended a ~ajor component of those procedures.

The

DC judgment was clearly in error on this point, and summary re-

versal might be appropriate.

The DC was extraordinarily casual

in its willingness to invalidate a large portion of Florida administrative procedure.
However, the passage from appt's brief before theCA,
quoted by appee at Motion to Dismiss or Deny, at 14-15, does suggest that appt might have conceded this point before the CA.

I

would call for the record to ascertain whether appt made this
concession.
(2) The DC's ruling on qualified immunity is not well
supported in this Court's cases, which, as appt observes, generally seem to assume that the "objective" portion of the good
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faith immunity test refers to whether the constitutional or statutory right alleged to have been violated was clearly established
at the time of the violation.

Here, the DC did not find that the

administrative rulings which made appts' conduct clearly illegal
conferred any actionable right upon appee.
. .
However, t h e /CA 11 rule .
1s not.
1ncons1stent
w1t h t h e

underlying rationale for qualified immunity.

.c-7
~
J

If qualified immu-

nity is designed to avoid chilling official performance of lawful
duties, then nothing is lost by withholding immunity from officials for actions clearly illegal under state law.

Further, it

is not clear how much the rule actually expands official liability, for state law requirements will often create property rights
whose deprivation would be actionable under the fourteenth amendment in any case.

Finally, there is no conflict between the two

circuits -- CA 1 and CA 11 -- that have so far considered the
question.

The appeal here should be treated as a petn for cert

and, as such, denied.
~

5.

RECOMMENDATION:

I recommend CFRecord.

There is a response.
November 1, 1983

Charny

Opin in petn
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lfp/ss
MEMORANDUM
TO:

David

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DA'T'E:

April 6, 1984

83-490 Davis v. Scherer
Attached is a copy of my rough memo to file.
less you disagree with it,
I

I

Un-

will not need a bench memo.

.,

may not have the procedural due process/Florida

statute invalidation sequence accurately in mind.

But you

can brief me on this orally at a later date.

ss

·'

I.

lfp/ss 04/13/84

DAVISl SALLY-POW
83-490 Davis v. Scherer

MEMO TO FILE:
This

is an appeal

from CAll that presents two

-

The case is a mess, and one we should not have

issues.

__..,

noted.

I voted to D&D it.

In briefest summary,

the appellee was a Florida

employee who wanted to take a second "moonlighting" job.
A controversy developed with his superiors, and in the end
he

resigned.

Apparently

he

The

facts

in

was

fired

from

refused to give it up.
Florida

Career

this

respect

one of

his

are
jobs

§1983

Service

suit

in

after

he

He appealed his termination to the
Commission,

but

settlement before a hearing was ever had.
this

confusing.

federal

DC

agreed

to

a

Appellee filed

alleging

denial

or
;

procedural due

process

-----......

in

that

no

hearing

was

provided

before termination of employment.
DC

'Ihe

invalidated

the

Florida

statutes

providing termination proceedings (the 1975 statutes), but
these were superseded by a 1981 revision of the relevant
statutes
appellee's

- - - - --'--a

revision

termination.

-

that

occurred

subsequent

to

The District Court nevertheless

,/

by an amended judgment,

invalidated the 1981 statutes as

well as those of 1977.
The Attorney General of

Florida,

on behalf of

appellants, argues rather persuasively that the DC had no
authority to invalidate the 1981 statutes.

There was no

-·-

live controversy under them, and the case had become moot.
Although I may not have the situation sorted out
entirely

accurately,

decisions

below

I

think

that

unnecessarily.

we

should

invalidated

vacate

Florida

the

statutes

X

I thought we took this case, not to address the
foregoing

Jt

qualified

issue,

but
.!.{_-

immunity

to

to
the

consider

the

DC's

state officials.

denial
Even

of

though

the DC held that there was no "violation of any clearly
established constitutional rule", appellants had acted in
violation of Florida state statutes.
the

DC,

was

the

equivalent

of

This, according to

violating

an

established
-

federal

constitutional

right,

immunity was not available.

and

therefore

good

faith'

J

Since CAll merely affirmed on

the basis of the opinion below, we have no discussion of
this issue by the Court of Appeals.
The DC decided this case prior to our decision
in Harlow v.

Fitzgerald.

Apart

from that,

however,

the

'·
'

.

line of qualified immunity cases beginning with Pierson v.
~make

it perfectly clear that in an action under §1983

the objective qualified immunity test applies only to the
violation of a federal constitutional right.

There is no

authority for the DC's position that violation of a state
statute is sufficient to deny good faith immunity.
On this issue, I think Harlow is controlling.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss
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CHAMBERS OF THE
CHIEF ...ILl:3TIC[

.84 HAY -2 A10 :50

Memorandum to the Chief Justice
From Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall

Thurgood has examined Davis v. Scherer,
No. 83-490, and concluded that he probably
cannot write in support of the reversal on the
issue of qualified immunity. Accordingly, he
is not transferring Berkemer v. McCarthy,
No. 83-710, to Bill in exchange.
Therefore, we feel that Davis v. Scherer
should be assigned to someone other than either
of us. Bill is willing to take anything that
any other Justice in the majority to reverse
Davis v. Scherer is willing to exchange.
Sincerely,
/ /1

l i.. ,
.
/ ),. (

I •'

t. \

W.J.B.

T.M.

C:H-111:"& 0,.

May 2, 1984

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

MEMORANDUM TO:

Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice

White
Blackmun
Powell
Rehnquist
Stevens
O'Connor

See attached.
Regards,

May 4, 1984

Dear Chief:
This refers to your letter of May 2 asking for a
volunteer to take Davis v. Scherer 83-490 off of Bill Brennan's hands in exchange for a case in which he is in the
majority.
As I understand no one has held up his or her
"hand", I gingerly raise mine. It seems clear that Bill
needs another case. I am reluctant to surrender one of the
three cases you assigned to me as I am in a position to
write all three of them before the June 1 target date. Also
I have lost one case you assigned to me earlier.
But I understand Bill's desire not to be left with
only one case from the April arguments. Accordingly, I am
glad to offer him 83-245/83-291 Pension Benefit Corp. v.
Gray.
I would prefer to retain the other two cases assigned me. But if Bill does not want to write Pension Benefit, he may have Armco (83-297).
Scherer is almost a •non-case•, but I will take it
for a Per Curiam unless someone would like to write a Court
opinion on it.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

.tlUFmt.t Ql1tmi lff flrt ~b .Allah•
:.uJringtcn. ~. <!1· 2Dp~~
CH ... I41!1EAS OP'

.JUSTICE

w... ..I.

BRENNAN, .JR.

May 4, 1984

Dear Chief,
Lewis has been good enough to let
me have Nos. 83-245 and 83-291, Pension
Benefit Corp. v. Gray, etc., and I'm
happy to have it.
I assume that Davis
v. Scherer, No. 83-490, in which Lewis
has suggested writing a~ curiam, will
be assigned to him.
Sincerely, .

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

lfp/ss 05/18/84
MEMORANDUM
DATE:

TO:

David

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

May 18, 1984

83-490 Davis v. Scherer
It is apparent that you did not find this case
as easy

to write as

I

had

assumed.

Your draft opinion

persuades me that I did not fully understand the case, and
still have some uncertainties about it.

I have scanned

the opinion once and now - as I reread it - I will dictate
comments of varying degrees of importance.
1.

You will not be surprised when I say that my

one firm impression is that the opinion is too long.
should make the arguments
form -

(especially in IIB)

We

in summary

without repeating so much of what prior

immunity

cases have said.
2.

Add a footnote in the statement of the

identifying the appellants and the capacities

cas~

(personal)

in which they are being sued.
3.

Page 5 is not clear to me.

appellee filed
Commission,

It states that

an administrative appeal with the Florida

claiming

that

the

rule

employment had not been validly adopted.

governing

dual

The draft then

,.

2.

states

that

five

months

later,

appellee

filed

with

the

same commission a petition challenging the validity of the
dismissal rule.
that

the

filed

rule was

with

the

difference?
invalid.

It then states that the commission agreed

The

invalid.

Were two separate petitions

commission,

and

commission

held

if

so

what

that

What is the relevance of this?

this

was

the

rule

was

My understanding

is that this rule is not the administrative regulation at
issue.
4.

On pp. 6 and 7, the draft briefly describes

the present suit and the action of the courts below.

It

seems to me that the opinion would be better understood if
this

portion

of

Part

I

were

clearer exactly what happened.

expanded

to make

somewhat

See, for example, the SG's

statement of the case, p. 2-4 of his brief.

I am inclined

to think that a reader of the opinion will be helped by
stating in Part I - rather than in Part II as the draft i~ /
now written

-

the change of

the DC' s

holding

following

CAS's decision in Weisbrod.
5.

It seems to me, David, that Part II requires

a good deal of revison.

It now starts out with Harlow (p.

8), and the reader has to look to footnote

4 to get any

real idea of the question presented and how it arose.

3.

It

is

critical

expressly held,

to

our

decision

in its second opinion,

that

the

DC

that the asserted

due process right was not clearly established at the time
of

appellants

question.
note

I

should

Harlow.

conduct.

Footnote

4

addresses

this

am inclined to think the substance of that
go

in

the

text

prior

to

any

discus ion

of

You properly conclude at the end of footnote

4

that the District Court was right in finding no violation
of

a

clearly

established

constitutional

right.

If

Weisbrod fairly can be read in this way - as the DC read
it -

is not

this

the controlling law in CAS?

We could

then add in a much shorter footnote the substance of your
discussion

to

the

effect

that

even

under

Supreme Court

decisions the law as to the type of hearing was far from
clear.
Certainly

in

this

case

the

DC's

holding

is

justified by the facts you summarize in the next to th'e "
last paragraph
notice

plus

objections,
attentive
should

of
an

and

note

4.

In

extended
indeed

perhaps

appellee had

opportunity
the

and gave him some

include

truth,

highway

relief.

with

some

to

full

state

his

department

was

It seems

to me we

elaboration

-

this

paragraph in the text as further evidence that there was

4.

no

objective

basis

for

appellants

to

believe

they

were

violating appellee's constitutional rights.
6.
Circuit

and

After concluding that at least in the Fifth
under

the

circumstances

of

this

case,

the

right claimed was not clearly established, the question is
whether

there was

a deprivation of constitutional rights

because of a failure to comply with a state administrative
regulation.

None of the briefs adequately addresses this

question.

Section

constitutional

and

1983

applies

statutory

only

rights.

clearly established constitutional

If

right,

to
there
and

federal
was

no

no federal

statutory right, is a cause of action alleged under §1983?
Footnote 9 is appellee's brief

(p.

32)

is revealing.

It

argues that even if plaintiff's constitutional rights were
not clearly established,
"designed

to

protect

actionable under §1983.

violation of a
constitutional

state regulation
interest"

is

The footnote states that:

"Implicit in this inquiry is the existence of a
constitutional principle, for the §1983 damage
relief is aimed at violation of federal, not
state law."
In other words, as I understand it, the argument
is that because the state regulation arguably was intended
to protect constitutional "interests", §1983 applies.

But

5.

that section applies only to violations of constitutional
rights.
7.

In subpart

contention
rather

that

than

frivolous,

the

IIA, you address the appellee! s

alleged

breach

"discretionary"

and

I

was

duties.

would answer

of

This

it simply

"ministr ial"
argument

in a

is

footnote.

Determining whether to discharge an employee, particularly
on

the

facts

of

this

case,

was

clearly

a

judgment

or

discretionary "call".
8.

Subpart IIB

(pp.

15-23)

is puzzling to me,

perhaps because I still do not understand this case.

It

also seems substantial repetitious of what has been said particularly in Harlow and Butz.
noted

above,

implicitly

is

a

requirement

that

the

state

"constitutional
of

the

regulation

principle":

specific

specified in the regulation.

Appellee's argument, as

procedural

embodies

namely,
due

the

process

-"
Yet, if Weisbrod can be read

as saying the nature and extent of procedural due process
relevant to this case is not clearly established in CAS, I
would think that the state regulation may

require

state law.
and we would

'·

something

different

is

to the extent it
only

a

matter

of

If so, there should be no action under §1983,
not

reach

the

immunity

issue.

The SG and

6.

your draft (Part IIB) do not appear to make this argument.
Rather,

you

argue

regulation

ever

constitutional
immunity?

Is

the

may

broader

establish

violation,

and

it necessary

for

question whether
a
if
us

basis

for

so

there

is

a

state

asserting . a
qualified

to make such a broad

argument in this case?
At

this point,

briefed by you.

it

is clear

I

need to be

We can get together Saturday morning.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

that

lfp/ss 05/22/84
MEMORANDUM
TO:

David

May 22, 1984

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

83-490 Davis v. Scherer
This

is being dictated at horne Monday evening

after reading your second draft.
below,

Subject to what is said

I find this draft much clearer and more persuasive

than our first.

I still have troubles.

The first 11 pages are fine.
At the outset of Part II
important

point

that

the

DC

(p.

relied

12)

upon

you make the
a

"totality"

analysis rather than the objective standard of Harlow.
agree

that

whether

no

there

constitutional
have known".

"circumstances"
was

a

"clearly

are

relevant

established

right of which a

other

I

than

statutory

or

reasonable person would

I still wonder, however, David, whether the ,.

.

reference in Harlow - and other cases - was not to federal
statutory

rights.

Clearly

we

were

talking

only

about

federal constitutional rights.
Appellee makes

two arguments.

On the basis of

the DC's second opinion and the law in CAS,

..

,

there is no

merit

to

appellee's

first

argument

that

there

was

a

violation of a "clearly established constitutional right".
Appellee's

second

argument

apparently

the

troublesome one - is that "absent a violation of a clearly
established constitutional right",

there was a violation

of a clearly established state administrative regulation
(a

"state

statute"),

and

this

forecloses

qualified

immunity.
In IIA, you dispose of appellee's first argument
by making two points:

(i)

the law in CAS, as established

by Weisbrod clearly was to the contrary, as the DC below
recognized.

This, alone, seems to be a conclusive answer.

On p. 14 of your draft, you make the further point that it
was not unreasonable for

the Department to conclude that

appellee had in fact been provided with the fundamentals
of due process.

I

suggest,

David,

that you revise this

page to say that even if the constittuional question had
not

been

clearly

procedural

due

established

process

was

in

CAS,

accorded

the

substance

appellee,

and

of

this

fairly could be viewed as disposing of any constitutional
claim.
My difficulty

still

with the state regulation.

is

with

how

best

to deal

Unless we say, as I understand

appellee
embodies
the

to
a

argue,
federal

the

But

state

constitutional
because

regulation

immaterial.

that

in

view

it

is

of

regulation

due

process

state

the

law

simply

standard,
is

only

uncertainty

of

the

constitutional question in CAS, how can a state regulation
be

viewed

embodying

as

than

more

an

unsettled

constitutional question?
Appellee does argue that Harlow makes

immunity

available only to officials whose conduct conforms to a
standard of "objective legal reasonableness".

Again, this

can only apply in a §1983 case to a federal standard.
On page 16 you note that appellee argues that an
official's

violation

actionable

in

qualified

of

itself"

immunity

in

a

state

should
a

statute

deprive

suit

for

statutory or constitutional rights.

"although

the

official

violation

of

not
of

other

But what other such

rights are involved in this case?
From p.

17 to the end of Part II, you make the

policy "balancing" arguments that are persuasive.
continue to wonder whether we get that far.
a case where it is,

But I

Here we have

in effect, conceded that the law of

CAS was to the effect that discharging a state employee in
the

circumstances

of

this

case

did

not

violate

a

well

In addition, on the facts

established due process right.
of

this

case

we

had

the

functional

the basis of a

and

Harlow.

full

"totality of circumstances" -

test identified in Rhodes, but rejected Butz

of

The DC itself decided the

compliance with due process.
case on

equivalent

Thus,

in

the

a

in effect - by

absence

of

any

clear

constitutional violation, the only circumstance identified
is a state law.

And if that does not rise to the level of

a constitutional right, how does §1983 apply.

If it does

not, do we even reach the immunity issue?

* * *
David,
above

even

preliminarily,

understand this case.

though
I

do

we
not

discussed
suggest

much
that

of
I

the
fully

If what is said above prompts you

to adhere to your present draft at least tentatively,
suggest that you try it out on Joe Neuhaus,

I

identifying

for him my concerns.
I add one final point, as noted in the margin,
Part III on page 22 needs to be revised as it does not
seem to include the immunity issue.

Also we should look

closely at the statement of the question on p. 1.

L.F.P., Jr.

Proposed Opinion

~

Jwt

Davis v. Scherer, No. 83-490

It
JUSTICE

POWELL

delivered

the

opinion

of

the

Court.
This appeal requires us to decide whether a state
official

loses

his

qualified

immunity

from

suit

for

deprivation of federal constitutional rights because he is
found

to

have

violated

the

command

of

a

state

administrative regulation.
I

The

present

controversy

arose

when

appellee

Gregory Scherer, who was employed by the Florida Highway
Patrol as a radio-teletype operator, applied to permission
from the Patrol to work as well for the Escambia County
Sheriff's

Off ice

as

a

reserve deputy.

2.

Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles

~~~~~
/\ ~quir~d
members

that
be

proposed

examined

to

0 outside ' employment
detect

potential

of

Patrol

conflicts

of

interest.' ) '

~A

letter from appellee's troop commander Captain

K. S. Sconiers, dated September 1, 1977, granted appellee
permission to accept the part-time work.
that

permission

employment
department."

would

interfere
J. S.

be

Sa.

"should

rescinded

with

App.

The letter noted

your
Later

duties
that

[the]

in

[the]

month,

Capt.
,

Sconiers

informed appellee by memorandum that permissioh

to accept the employment was revoked.
explained at

trial,

his

superiors

As Capt.

Sconiers

in the Highway Patrol

had determined that appellee's reserve deputy duties might
conflict with his duties at the Highway Patrol.

3.

Appellee
despite
and

the

an

continued

memorandum

exchange

of

of

to

work

at

revocation.

letters

superiors

ensued.

Sgt.

superior,

advised

appellee

second

Oral

among

Clark,

the

discussions

appellee

appellee's

that

he

job,

was

and

his

immediate
violating

instructions; appellee explained that he had invested too
much money in uniforms to give up his parttime work.
Wiggins,

appellee's

memorandum

ordered

next

superior,

appellee

to

quit

then
his

orally
job.

Lt.

and

by

Appellee

explained to Lt. Wiggins that he saw no conflict between
the two jobs and would not quit his second job.
Sgt.
memoranda

Clark

to

and

Lt.

Wiggins

Capt.

Sconiers

that

continued

employment

and

their

appellee.

Appellee

also

wrote

had

submitted

described

appellee's

conversations
to

Capt.

with

Sconiers

4.

explaining
employment.
Col. J. E.

that

he

saw no reason

On this basis, Capt.

to resign his outside
Sconiers recommended to

Beach, director of the Florida Highway Patrol,

that appellee be suspended for three days for violation of
the

dual

Capt.
his

employment

policy.

With

his

recommendation,

Sconiers submitted a number of documents, including
own

letters

approving

appellee's

request

and

rescinding the approval: appellee's letter of request and
subsequent letter explaining his refusal to quit his job:
and the memoranda of Sgt. Clark and Lt. Wiggins. 1
basis

of

these

documents,

Col.

Beach

ordered

On the
that

appellee's employment be terminated effective October 20,

1
one memorandum reported to Capt. Sconie 0r t h: :appelle: \
had continued to work at his second job:
a second had
been addressed by Lt. Wiggins to appellee: other memoranda
Lt. Wiggins' and Sgt. Clark's discussion with appellee.

1977.
On
with

the

November

Florida

10 ,

Career

1977,

appellee

Service

~~

filed

an appeal

Commission.

Appellee

/\

claimed that he had been dismissed without just cause, as
his dismissal was pursuant to a rule -- the rule governing
dual employment -- that had not been adopted validly by
the

Five months

department.

later,

appellee

filed

with

the Commission a petition that challenged the validity of

the rul2

~

<11

Ae~~ ~Lle~' S.

deeia<e~~e ~allaAged

petition, T he

rule was invalid.

Commission

Before

~

L--I-

e~

heard appellee's administrative appeal from his

1\

dismissal,

appellee

and

the

Department

tzM.,a~~~

dispute.
pay.

T~e

~~~~ reinstated

Friction

between

appellee

settled

app ~ lee

and

his

with

the
back

superiors

6.

~

continued)

fiewe·v•e :l_~ 41'1.

~

January 1979/o a-fter appel:i ~ was

~~ ' ~',._."""_

suspended from ~ Patrot \. ~; f isigned "to avoid further
harassment and to remove a cloud over his employability."
J.S. App. 23a •

.(~~~

Appell ~ ~~ filed the present suit in the United

States

District

Court

for

the

Florida, seeking relief under 42
complaint

alleged

that

the

Northern

u.s.c.

Department

District

of

I~
Appellee~s

§1983.
had

violated

the

Fourteenth Amendment by depriving him of his job without a
pretermination hearing and

by coercing him to accept an

inadequate settlement as compensation. The complaint also '

c::va.-. ~
alleged

violations

of ~ ~e

right

of

? 7
privacy

g· ~~

c::;;
I

under the First and Ninth Amendments.
a

declaration

award

that

his

rights

had

Appellee requested

been violated and an

of ~;~~~ t:fJi;;e;c az~

~)

7

7.

The District Court granted the requested relief
for violation of appellee's Fourteenth Amendment rights.
The

J+found

IH s-tF iet

Cettr-t

that

"

appellee

had

a

2

property

interest in his job and that neither a pretermination nor
a prompt post-termination hearing had been provided
as

required

~t
governing

by

the

Due

Process

~
l ourt?
eclared

removal

of

state

F-tir ~ er, 1he

clause.

Florida's

statutory

employees

~

provisions

unconstitutional

"insofar as they fail to provide a prompt post-termination

~
hearing."

J. S.

concluded

that

immunity

from

compensatory

Ap. •

7 Sa.

appellants
suit

damages ..

had

under

e.e

The

Bistr-iG-t.. / ourt ..1\

forfeited

section

ep~el~.

their

1983

~

' "
qualifie'd

and

The Court of

awarded
Appeals

2 The DC rejected appellees' other constitutional claims.

8.

for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed without opinion.
We

noted

probable

u.s.

jurisdiction,

(1983) , 3 and now reverse.
II
Harlow
established

v.

that

Fitzgerald,
"government

457

u.s.

800

officials

(1982),

performing

91-~
3 Th is
case
~ ~hin
the
Court's
appellate
jurisdiction because the judgment d clared a state statute
unconstitutional.
28 u.s.c. §1254(2 . Appellee concedes,
however, that the District Court 1 eked jurisdiction to
consider
the constitutionality of
the
Florida civil
service statute now in force. tiTat replaced the statute
under which appellee's em_El_q:rment was terminated.
The
current State statute was ~~ applied to appellee, who
therefore
lacks
standing
to
question
its
constitutionality.
Cf. Golden v. Zwickler, 394 u.s. 10} ,
(1969).
.
Appellee's concession does not deprive the Court
of
appellate
jurisdiction
over
the
case.
That
jurisdiction comprises the power to decide the "Federal
questions presented," 28 u.s.c. §1254(2). Cf. Flournoy v.
Wiener, 321 u.s. 253, 263 (1944); Leroy v. Great Western
United Corp., 443 u.s. 173 (1979).
Under §1254(2), the
Court retains discretion to decline to consider those
issues in the case not related to the declaration that the
State state is invalid.
In the present case, however, we
~
consider the important question whether the
District Court and the Court of Appeals properly denied
appellants' good faith immunity from suit.

9.

discretionary

functions

civil damages

insofar

are

as

shielded

from

liability

for

their conduct does not violate

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known."
818.

The

"objective

touchstone

of

reasonableness

qualified
of

an

457

immunity

official's

-«,/\o

District

Court

1-

not

is

the
as

rd.

I

held , that

right that provided the basis for
appellee was

t

at

conduct

measured by reference to clearly established law."
The

u.s.,

the

Due

Process

the relief granted to

so clearly established at

the

time of

' "
appellants' conduct as to deprive appellants of their gooti

faith

immunity. 4

The

District Court

reasoned,

however,

4 The District Court initially held that appellee's Due
Process right to a hearing before termination of his
employment was clearly established by Thurston v. Dekle,
531 F.2d 1264 (1976).
After the Court of Appeals decided
the case of Weisbrod v. Donigan, 651 F.2d 334, 336 (1981),
Footnote continued on next page.

10.

that

a-

"if

an

official

violates

his

agency's

explicit

however, the District Court amended its judgment, as
Weisbrod apparently interpreted Thurston hot to establish
clearly the constitutional right of state employees to a
pretermination or a prompt post-termination hearing.
This holding technically is not comprised within
the questions presented by appellants'
jurisdictional
statement. Nonetheless, as a matter of the sound exercise
of our discretion, see note 3, supra, we would not reverse
the judgment below on qualified immunity grounds nor reach
the ~ issues presented by this case, if appellee
had established that appellants had forfeited
their
qualified
immunity by violating clear c6nstitutional
rights.
We therefore note that we agree with the holding
of the District Court.
Although it apparent 1Y was well
established by 1975 that Florida law grante ~mployees a
property interest, protected by the Due Process clause, in
permanent C~r~r ~~' it was unclear, at the time
of the incident that gave rise to the present lawsuit,
what procedures the Constitution required for termination
of employment.
The decisions of this Court had required
"some form of hearing."
But, as we had considered
circumstances in which no hearing at all had been provided
prior to termination of employment, Board of Relents v.
Roth, 408 u.s. 564 (1972), Perry v. Sinderman,
08 u.s.
593 (1972), or in which the requirements of due proces,s ,
were met, Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 u.s. 134 (1974), Bishop
v. Wood, 426 u.s. 341 (1976), we had no occasion to
specify any set of minimally acceptable procedures.
Nor
did the applicable precedents of the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit resolve this question.
We give some
deference
to
that
court's conclusion that the
law
governing termination of state employees was unclear. See
Weisbrod v. Donigan, supra.
In any case, the court's
conclusion appears correct with regard to the law that
would be applicable to the present suit.
The prior Fifth
Circuit case upon which the District Court had relied,
Thurston v. Dekle, supra, concerned the procedures that
the City of Jacksonville must follow to discharge members
Footnote continued on next page.

11.

regulations, which have the force of state law,
evidence

68a.

that
The

his

conduct

court

found

is

unreasonable."

appellants

to

[that] is
J. S.

have

App.
acted

unreasonably because they had violated personnel rules of
the Florida Highway Patrol that required a pre-termination
investigation. 5

In

our

view,

the

District

Court's

of its Civil Service.
The circumstances of the present
case differ in important respects from those in Thurston.
A balancing of the state and individual interests relevant
to the Due Process analysis, see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
u.s. 319, 334-335 (1976), may dictate different procedures
to govern the relation of the State to the members of its
police force.
It was not unreasonable, under general Fourteenth
Amendment principles, for the Department to conclude that
appellee had been provided with the rudiments of due ,
process.
Appellee was informed several times of th~
Department's objection to his employmentt and
ppellee
took advantage of several opportunities to present his
reasons for retaining his second employment.
It is
undisputed that appellee's statement of reasons and other
relevant information were before the official who made the
decision to terminate appellee's employment.
And Florida
law provided
for
a
full
evidentiary hearing
after
termination.
We conclude, as did the District Court, that
there was no violation of appellee's clearly established
constitutional rights.
Footnote(s) 5 will appear on following pages.

12.

reasoning is inconsistent with our precedents.
A

Appellee

urges

that

we

need

not decide whether

appellants forfeited their qualified immunity by violating
the Highway Patrol regulation.

Rather, appellee contends

that he is entitled to damages for appellants' breach of
their "ministerial" duty --established by the regulation to

follow

various

procedures

before

terminating

5 These rules specified in pertinent part:
Upon receiving a report of ••• a violation of
Department or Division rules and regulations
••. ,
the
Director
shall
order
a
complete
investigation
to
determine
the
true
facts
concerning the circumstances surrounding the
alleged offense.
The completed investigation
report will also contain a written statement
made by the employee against whom the complain
was made.
If after a thorough study of all
information
concerning
the
violation,
the
Director decides that a .•• dismissal will be in
order, he will present the employee in writing
with the reason or reasons for such actions.
General Order No.
6 9a.

J. S. App.

43 §l.C

(September 1, 1977), quoted at

13.

appellee's employment.
Appellee's

contention

misapprehends

the

narrow

reach of the conception of "ministerial duty" as it has
been

applied

in

the

context

of

official

immunity. 6

A

ministerial duty is one that leaves the official no choice
as

to

how

to

act.

A law

or

administrative

directive

establishes such a duty when it unambiguously sets forth
each act that is required of the official and deprives the
official
E.g.,

of

any

Amy v.

Kendall v.

to

deviate

The Supervisors,

78 u.s.

Stokes,

authority

44 u.s.

87,

98

from
136,

(1845).

its
138

terms.
(1870);

By contrast·,

6 of course, a statute or regulation that deprives an
official of all discretion will be rare indeed.
Perhaps
for that reason, the Court has had no occasion to consider
the place of the "ministerial duty" exception in the
modern doctrine of qualified immunity. Our disposition of
appellee's contention makes it unnecessary to consider
this question, A-G\l)::' e ~;o.

14.

the

rules

"ministerial"

duties

appellants

a

in

the

present

substantial

Appellants

were

constituted

a

to

measure

determine,

"complete

appellants'

established

purportedly

that

for

investigation"

case
of

left

to

discretion.

example,
and

a

what

"thorough

study of all information" sufficient to justify a decision
to terminate appellee's employment.
The

District

Court's

See note 5, supra.

finding

that

appellants

exceeded the scope of their authority or ignored a clear
legal command does not bear on the "ministerial" nature of
appellants' duties.
confuses

the

discretionary
immunity.

Appellee's submission to the contrary

issues
and

whether

whether

the

the

official's

official

action

forfeited

was
his

Whether a duty is ministerial or discretionary

depends upon the law that creates that duty, not upon the

15.

facts

of

the

official 1 s

conduct.

A law

that

fails

to

specify the precise action that the official must take in
each

instance

creates

that authority

remains

it is abused.

Cf.

(1896):

Kendall v.

only

discretionary

authority:

and

discretionary however egregiously

Spalding v.

Vilas,

Stokes, supra.

161

u.s.

483,

498

As we have concluded,

appellants were exercising discretionary authority in the
decisions that are the subject of the present lawsuit.
B

Nor

does

appellants

1

failure

to

comply

with

a

~ olea~ state regulation deprive them of qualified immunit~

from suit for violation of federal constitutional rights. 7

7 The District Court relied in part on the reasoning of
Williams v. Treen, 671 F.2d 892 (CAS 1982), that had held
that official conduct in violation of an explicit and
clearly
established
state
regulation
was
~
se
unreasonable.
Id., at 899.
The District Court,
in
Footnote continued on next page.

,

16.

It was well established even before Harlow that, under the
"objective"

prong

of

the good

faith

immunity

test,

"an

official would not be held liable in damages under §1983
unless

the

violated

constitutional

was

violation."

'clearly
Butz v.

right

he

established'
Economou,

438

was

alleged

at

the

u.s.

to have

time

478,

498

of

the

(1978)

contrast,
thought that such conduct was one factor
relevant to the inquiry, although it did not indicate what
other factors it considered pertinent in the present case.
As we explain, however, even the more limited weight that
the District Court gave to the State regulation is
inconsistent with qualified immunity doctrine.
The District Court's application of the "totality
of the circumstances" test articulated in Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 u.s. 232, 247-248 (1974), see J.S. App. 68a,
suggests that the court may have viewed the clear ,
violation of a state regulation as evidence relevant tb
appellants' subjective intent as well as to the objective
reasonableness of their conduct.
After Harlow, the
official's intent or state of mind simply is not relevant
to the qualified immunity defense.
Even if the existence
of a clear statutory or administrative command reflected
upon the official's subjective intent, therefore, that
fact would have no bearing on the question of immunity.
We decline to disinter even in truncated form the preHarlow inquiry into the motives for the official's
conduct.

17.

(emphasis

u.s.

added} •

555,

violations

562
do

See

also Procunier

(1978}.
not

v.

Navarette,

434

Officials sued for constitutional

lose

their

qualified

immunity merely

because their conduct might violate some other statutory
or administrative norm. 8
A contrary rule

would disrupt

the

balance

that

our cases strike between the interests in the vindication

01tLs
of

~

constitutional

effective

performance

rights
of

irnrnuni ty doctrines fosters

their

and

in

public

duties.

respect for

The

officials'
qualified

fundamental ci vi 1

8 rn Harlow, the Court acknowledged that officials may
lose their immunity by violating "clearly established
statutory
r i ght s • "
4 57 U. S • , at 818 •
Th i s i s the
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III

For

these reasons,

the

judgment of

the Court of

Appeals is reversed and the case remanded for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellants in this case challenge the holding of the Court of
Appeals that ·a state official loses his qualified immunity from
suit for deprivation of federal constitutional rights if he is
found to have violated the clear command of a state administrative regulation.
I
The present controversy arose when appellee Gregory
Scherer, who was employed by the Florida Highway Patrol
as a radio-teletype operator, applied for permission from the
Patrol to work as well for the Escambia County Sheriff's Office as a reserve deputy. To avoid conflicts of interest, an
order of the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles required that proposed outside employment of
Patrol members be approved by the Department. A letter
from appellee's troop commander Captain K. S. Sconiers,
dated September 1, 1977, granted appellee permission to accept the part-time work. The letter noted that permission
would be rescinded "should [the] employment interfere ...
with your duties with [the] department." App. to Juris.
Statement 5a. Later that month, Capt. Sconiers informed
appellee by memorandum that permission to accept the employment was revoked. As Capt. Sconiers explained at
trial, his superiors in the Highway Patrol had determined
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that appellee's reserve deputy duties could conflict with his
duties at the Highway Patrol.
Appellee continued to work at the second job, despite the
revocation of permission. Oral discussions and an exchange
of letters among appellee and his superiors ensued. Sgt.
Clark, appellee's immediate superior, advised appellee that
he was violating instructions; appellee explained that he had
invested too much money in uniforms to give up his part-time
work. Lt. Wiggins, the next highest officer in the chain of
command, then orally and by memorandum ordered appellee
to quit his part-time job. Appellee explained to Lt. Wiggins
that he saw no conflict between the two jobs and would not
quit his second job.
Sgt. Clark and Lt. Wiggins had submitted memoranda to
Capt. Sconiers that described appellee's continued employment and their conversations with appellee. Appellee also
wrote to Capt. Sconiers explaining that he saw no reason· to
resign his outside employment. So advised, Capt. Sconiers
recommended to Col. J. E. Beach, director of the Florida
Highway Patrol, that appellee be suspended for three days
for violation of the dual-employment policy. Capt. Sconiers
submitted a number of documents, including his own letters
approving appellee's request and rescinding the approval; appellee's letter of request and subsequent letter explaining his
refusal to quit his job; and the memoranda of Sgt. Clark and
Lt. Wiggins. 1 On the basis of these documents, Col. Beach
on October 24, 1977, ordered that appellee's employment
with the Florida Highway Patrol be terminated.
On November 10, 1977, appellee filed an appeal with the
Florida Career Service Commission. Before the Commission had heard appellee's administrative appeal from his dismissal, appellee and the Department settled the dispute.
' One memorandum reported to Capt. Sconiers that appellee had continued to work at his second job; a second had been addressed by Lt. Wiggins
to appellee; other memoranda summarized Lt. Wiggins' and Sgt. Clark's
discussions with appellee.

..
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The settlement reinstated appellee with back pay. But friction between appellee and his superiors conti11ued, and in
January 1979, after appellee was suspended from the Patrol,
he resigned "to avoid further harassment and to remove a
cloud over his employability." App. to Juris. Statement 23a.
Appellee then filed the present suit against appellants in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Florida, seeking relief under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. 2 Appellee's
complaint alleged that appellants in 1977 had violated the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by discharging
appellee from his job without a formal pretermination or a
prompt post-termination hearing. 3 Appell~e requested a
declaration that his rights had been violated and an award of
money damages.
·
The District Court granted the requested relief for violation of appellee's Fourteenth Amendment rights. 4 The
court found that appellee had a .property interest in his job
and that the procedures followed by appellants to discharge
appellee were constitutionally "inadequate" under the Fourteenth Amendment. App. to Juris. Statement 35a. Further, the court declared unconstitutional Florida's statutory
provisions governing removal of state employees, Fla. Stat.
§ 110.061 (1977). Finally, the District Court concluded that
appellants had forfeited their qualified immunity from suit
under § 1983 because appellee's "due process rights were
2
Appellant Ralph Davis was Executive Director of the Department of
Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles at the time of appellee's discharge
from employment. Appellant Chester Blakemore succeeded Davis to that
position and is a party only in his official capacity. Appellant Colonel J.
Eldridge Beach is Director of the Florida Highway Patrol, a division of the
Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles; as noted above, he
held that position at the time of appellee's discharge.
3
The complaint also alleged that appellants, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, had coerced appellee to accept an inadequate settlement and had infringed upon appellee's the right of privacy guaranteed by
the First and Ninth Amendments.
' The District Court rejected appellee's other constitutional claims.
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clearly established at the time of his October 24, 1977 dismissal." App. to Juris. ·statement 46a.
Five days after entry of the District Court's order, the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided Weisbrod v.
Donigan, 651 F. 2d 334 (1981).
The Court of Appeals there
held that Florida officials in 1978 had violated no well established due process rights in discharging a permanent state
employee without a pre-termination or a prompt post-termination hearing. On motion for reconsideration, the District
Court found that Weisbrod required it to vacate its prior
holding that appellants had forfeited their immunity by violating appellee's clearly established constitutional rights.
Th.e court nevertheless reaffirmed its award of monetary
damages. It reasoned that proof that an official had violated
clearly established constitutional rights was not the "sole
way" to overcome the official's claim of qualified immunity.
Applying the "totality of the circumstances" test of Scheuer
v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 247-248 (1974), the District Court
held that "if an official violates his agency's explicit regulations, which have the force of state law, [that] is evidence
that his conduct is unreasonable." App. to Juris. Statement
68a. 5 In this respect, the court noted that the personnel
regulations of the Florida Highway Patrol clearly required "a
complete investigation of the charge and an opportunity [for
the employee] to respond in writing." Id., at 70a. 6 The
6
The District Court relied in part on the reasoning of Williams v.
Treen, 671 F. 2d 892 (CA5 1982), cert denied,- U. S . - (1983), that
had held that official conduct in violation of an explicit and clearly established state regulation was per se unreasonable. I d., at 899.
6
These rules specified in pertinent part:
Upon receiving a report of ... a violation of Department or Division rules
and regulations ... , the Director shall order a complete investigation to
determine the true facts concerning the circumstances surrounding the alleged offense. The completed investigation report will also contain a written statement made by the employee against whom the complaint was
made. If after a thorough study of all information concerning the violation, the Director decides that a ... dismissal will be in order, he will
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District Court concluded that appellants in discharging appel• · lee had "followed procedures contrary to the department's
rules and regulations"; therefore, appellants were "not entitled to qualified immunity because their belief in the legality
of the challenged conduct was unreasonable." Ibid. The
court explicitly relied upon the official violation of the personnel rule, stating that "if [the] departmental order had not
been adopted ... prior to [appellee's] dismissal, no damages
of any kind could be awarded." Ibid. The District Court's
order amending the judgment did not discuss the issue
whether appellants violated appellee's federal constitutional
rights. On that issue, the District Court relied upon its previous opinion; the court did not indicate that the personnel
regulation was relevant to its analysis of appellee's rights
under the due process clause.
The District Court also amended its judgment declaring
the Florida civil service statute unconstitutional. The
State's motion for reconsideration had informed the court
that the statute had been repealed by the Florida legislature.
The District Court therefore declared unconstitutional the
provisions of the newly enacted civil service statute, Fla.
Stat. ch. 110 (1981), "insofar as they fail to provide a prompt
post-termination hearing." App. to Juris. Statement 80a.
The Court of Appeals affirmed on the basis of the District
Court's opinion. We noted probable jurisdiction,-- U. S.
- - (1983), to consider whether the Court of Appeals properly had declared the Florida statute unconstitutional and denied appellants' claim of qualified immunity. Appellants do
not seek review of the District Court's finding that appellee's
constitutional rights were violated. As appellee now concedes that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate
the constitutionality of the Florida statute enacted in 1981,
present the employee in writing with the reason or reasons for such
actions.
General Order No. 43 § l.C (September 1, 1977), quoted at J . S. App. 69a.
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we consider only the issue of qualified immunity. 7
reverse.
II

We

In the present posture of this case, the District Court's decision that appellants violated appellee's rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment is undisputed. 8 This finding of the
District Court-based entirely upon federal constitutional
law-resolves the merits of appellee's underlying claim for
relief under§ 1983. It does not, however, decide the issue of
damages. Even defendants who violate constitutional rights
enjoy a qualified immunity that protects them from liability
for damages unless it is further demonstrated that their conduct was unreasonable under the applicable standard. The
precise standard for determining when an official may assert
the qualified immunity defense has been clarified by recent
cases, see Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308 (1975); Butz v.
Economou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U. S. 800 (1982). The present case requires us to consider
the application of the standard where the official's conduct violated a state regulation as well as a provision of the federal
Constitution.
The Florida civil service statute now in force replaced the statute
under which appellee's employment was terminated.
As the current
State statute was never applied to appellee, he lacks standing to question
its constitutionality. Cf. Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U. S. 103 (1969).
Appellee's concession does not deprive the Court of appellate jurisdiction
over the remaining issue in the case. In cases where the Court of Appeals
has declared a state statute unconsitutional, this Court may decide the
"Federal questions presented," 28 U. S. C. § 1254(2). Cf. Flournoy v.
Wiener, 321 U. S. 253, 263 (1944); Leroy v. Great Western United Corp.,
443 U. S. 173 (1979). Under § 1254(2), the Court retains discretion to decline to consider those issues in the case not related to the declaration that
the State statute is invalid. In the present case, however, we choose to
consider the important question whether the District Court and the Court
of Appeals properly denied appellants' good faith immunity from suit.
8
As we discuss below, it is contested whether these constitutional
rights were clearly established at the time of appellants' conduct.
7
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The District Court's analysis of appellants' qualified immunity, written before our decision in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
supra, rests upon the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding appellee's separation from his job. This Court applied that standard in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S., at
247-248.
As subsequent cases recognized, Wood v.
Strickland, supra, at 322, the "totality of the circumstances"
test comprised two separate inquiries: an inquiry into the objective reasonableness of the defendant official's conduct in
light of the governing law, and an inquiry into the official's
subjective state of mind. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, supra, rejected the inquiry into state of mind in favor of a wholly objective standard. Under Harlow, officials "are shielded
from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known." 457
U. S., at 818. Whether an official may prevail in his qualified immunity defense depends upon the "objective reasonableness of [his] conduct as measured by reference to clearly
established law." !d. (footnote deleted). No other "circumstances" are relevant to the issue of qualified immunity.
Appellee suggests, however, that the District Court judgment can be reconciled with Harlow in two ways. First, appellee urges that the record evinces a violation of constitutional rights that were clearly established. Second, in
appellee's view, the District Court correctly found that, absent a violation of clearly established constitutional rights,
appellants' violation of the state administrative regulationalthough irrelevant to the merits of appellee's underlying
constitutional claim-was decisive of the qualified immunity
question. In our view, neither submission is consistent with
our prior cases.
A

Appellee contends that the District Court's reliance in its
qualified immunity analysis upon the state regulation was
"superfluous," Brief for Appellee 19, because the federal con-
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stitutional right to a pre-termination or a prompt post-termination hearing was well established in the Fifth Circuit at the
time of the conduct in question. As the District Court recognized in rejecting appellee's contention, Weisbrod v.
Donigan, 651 F. 2d 334 (CA5 1981), is authoritative
precedent to the contrary. Nor was it unreasonable in this
case, under Fourteenth Amendment due process principles,
for the Department to conclude that appellee had been provided with the fundamentals of due process. 9 Appellee was
informed several times of the Department's objection to his
second employment and took advantage of several opportunities to present his reasons for retaining that employment.
Appellee's statement of reasons and other relevant information were before the senior official who made the decision to
discharge appellee. And Florida law provided for a full evidentiary hearing after termination. We conclude that the
District Court correctly held that appellee has demonstrated
no violation of his clearly established constitutional rights.
B

Appellee's second ground for affirmance in substance is
that upon which the District Court relied. Appellee submits
that appellants, by failing to comply with a clear state regulation, forfeited their qualified immunity from suit for violation
of federal constitutional rights.
Appellee makes no claim that the appellants' violation of
the state regulation either is itself actionable under § 1983 or
9
The decisions of this Court by 1978 had required "some kind of a hearing," Board of R egents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 570 n. 7 (1972), prior to discharge of an employee who had a constitutionally protected property interest in his employment. As the Court had considered circumstances in
which no hearing at all had been provided prior to termination, Perry v.
Sinderman, 408 U. S. 593 (1972), or in which the requirements of due process were met, Board of Regents v. Roth, supra; Arnett v. Kennedy, 416
U. S. 134 (1974); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341 (1976); Codd v. Velger, 429
U. S. 274 (1977), there had been no occasion to specify any minimally acceptable procedures for termination of employment.
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bears upon the claim of constitutional right that appellee asserts under § 1983. 10 And appellee also recognizes that Harlow v. Fitzgerald makes immunity available only to officials
whose conduct conforms to a standard of "objective legal
reasonableness." 457 U. S., at 819. Nonetheless, in appellee's view, official conduct that contravenes a statute or regulation is not "objectively reasonable" because officials fairly
may be expected to conform their conduct to such legal
norms. Appellee also argues that the lawfulness of official
conduct under such a statute or regulation may be determined early in the lawsuit on motion for summary judgment.
Appellee urges therefore that a defendant official's violation
of a clear statute or regulation, although not itself the basis of
suit, should deprive the official of qualified immunity from
damages for violation of other statutory or constitutional
provisions.
On its face, appellee's reasoning is not without some force.
We decline, however, to adopt it. Even before Harlow, our
cases had made clear that, under the "objective" component
of the good faith immunity test, "an official would not be held
liable in damages under§ 1983 unless the constitutional right
he was alleged to have violated was 'clearly established' at the
time of the violation." Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478,
498 (1978) (emphasis added); accord, Procunier v. Navarette,
434 U. S. 555, 562 (1978). Officials sued for constitutional
violations do not lose their qualified immunity merely because their conduct violates some statutory or administrative
provision. 11
•
'"State law may bear upon a claim under the due process clause when the
property interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment are created
by state law. See Board of Regents v. Roth, supra, at 577. Appellee's
property interest in his job under Florida law is undisputed. Appellee
does not contend here that the procedural rules in state law govern the
constitutional analysis of what process was due to him under the Fourteenth Amendment.
11
In Harlow , the Court acknowledged that officials may lose their immunity by violating "clearly established statutory . . . rights." 457 U. S., at
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We acknowledge of course that officials should conform
their conduct to applicable statutes and regulations. For
that reason, it is an appealing proposition that the violation of
such provisions is a circumstance relevant to the official's
claim of qualified immunity. But in determining what circumstances a court may consider in deciding claims of qualified immunity, we choose "between the evils inevitable in any
available alternative." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, supra, at
813-814. Appellee's submission, if adopted, would disrupt
the balance that our cases strike between the interests in vindication of citizens' constitutional rights and in public officials'
effective performance of their duties. The qualified immunity doctrine recognizes that officials can act without fear of
harassing litigation only if they reasonably can anticipate
when their conduct may give rise to liability for damages and
818. This is the case where the plaintiff seeks to recover damages for violation of those statutory rights, as in Harlow itself, see id., at 820 n. 36,
and as in many § 1983 suits, see; e. g., Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1
(1980) (holding that § 1983 creates cause of action against state officials for
violating federal statutes). For the reasons that we discuss, officials sued
for violations of rights conferred by a statute or regulation, like officials
sued for violation of constitutional rights, do not forfeit their immunity by
violating some other statute or regulation. Rather, these officials become
liable for damages only to the extent that there is a clear violation of the
statutory rights that give rise to the cause of action for damages. And if a
statute or regulation does give rise to a cause of action for damages, clear
violation of the statute or regulation forfeits immunity only with respect to
damages caused by that violation. In the present case, as we have noted,
there is no claim that the state regulation itself or the laws that authorized
· its promulgation create a cause of action for damages or provide the basis
for an action brought under § 1983.
Harlow was a suit against federal, not state, officials. But our cases
have recognized that the same qualified immunity rules apply in suits
against state officers under § 1983 and in suits against federal officers
under Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388
(1971). See Butz v. Economou, supra, at 504. Neither federal nor state
officials lose their immunity by violating the clear command of a statute or
regulation-of federal or of state law-unless that statute or regulation
provides the basis for the cause of action sued upon.
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only if unjustified lawsuits are quickly terminated. See Butz
v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 50&-507 (1978); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 814, 818--819. Yet, under appellee's
submission, officials would be liable in indeterminate amount
for violation of any constitutional right-one that was not
clearly defined or perhaps not even foreshadowed at the time
of the alleged violation-merely because their official conduct
also violated some statute or regulation. And, in § 1983
suits, the issue whether an official enjoyed qualified immunity then might depend upon the meaning or purpose of a
state administrative regulation, questions that federal judges
often may be unable to resolve on summary judgment.
Appellee proposes that his new rule for qualified immunity
be limited by requiring that plaintiffs allege clear violation of
a statute or regulation that advanced important interests or
was designed to protect constitutional rights. Yet, once the
door is opened to such inquiries, it is difficult to limit their.
scope in any principled manner. Federal judges would be
granted large discretion to extract from various statutory
and administrative codes those provisions that seem to them
sufficiently clear or important to warrant denial of qualified
immunity. And such judgments fairly could be made only
after an extensive inquiry into whether the official in the circumstances of his decision should have appreciated the applicability and importance of the rule at issue. It would become more difficult, not only for officials to anticipate the
possible legal consequences of their conduct, 12 but also for
trial courts to decide even frivolous suits without protracted
litigation.
Nor is it always fair, or sound policy, to demand official
compliance with statute and regulation on pain of money
12
Officials would be required not only to know the applicable regulations,
but also to understand the intent with which each regulation was adopted.
Such an understanding often eludes even trained lawyers with full access
to the relevant legislative or administrative materials. It is unfair and impracticable to require such an understanding of public officials generally.
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damages. Such officials as police officers or prison wardens,
to say nothing of higher-level executive levels who enjoy only
qualified immunity, routinely make close decisions in the exercise of the broad authority that necessarily is delegated to
them. These officials are subject to a plethora of rules,
"often so voluminous, ambiguous, and contradictory, and in
such flux that officials can comply with them only selectively." See P. Schuck, Suing Government 66 (1983). In
these circumstances, officials should not err always on the
side of caution. "[O]fficials with a broad range of duties and
authority must often act swiftly and firmly at the risk that
action deferred will be futile or constitute virtual abdication
of office." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S., at 246. 13
13
Appellee urges as well that appellants' violation of the personnel regulation constituted breach of their "ministerial" duty-established by the
regulation-to follow various procedures before terminating appellee's employment. Although the decision to discharge an employee clearly is discretionary, appellee reasons that the Highway Patrol regulation deprived
appellants of all discretion in determining what procedures were to be followed prior to discharge. Under this view, the Harlow standard is inapposite because this Court's doctrine grants qualified immunity to officials in
the performance of discretionary, but not ministerial, functions.
Appellee's contention mistakes the scope of the "ministerial duty" exception to qualified immunity in two respects. First, as we have discussed,
breach of a legal duty created by the personnel regulation would forfeit official immunity only if that breach itself gave rise to the appellee's cause of
action for damages. This principle equally applies whether the regulation
created discretionary or ministerial duties. Even if the personnel regulation did create a ministerial duty, appellee makes no claim that he is entitled to damages simply because the regulation was violated. See pp. 8-10
and note 11, supra.
In any event, the rules that purportedly established appellants' "ministerial" duties in the present case left to appellants a substantial measure of
discretion. Cf. Amy v. The Supervisors, 78 U. S. 136, 138 (1870); Kendall
v. Stokes, 44 U. S. 87, 98 (1845). Appellants were to determine, for example, what constituted a "complete investigation" and a "thorough study of
all information" sufficient to justify a decision to terminate appellee's employment. See note 6, supra. And the District Court's finding that appellants ignored a clear legal command does not bear on the "ministerial"
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III
A plaintiff who seeks damages for violation of constitutional or statutory rights may overcome the defendant official's qualified immunity only by showing that those rights
were clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue.
As appellee has made no such showing, the judgment of the
Court of Appeals is reversed and the case remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

nature of appellants' duties. A law that fails to specify the precise action
that the official must take in each instance creates only discretionary authority; and that authority remains discretionary however egregiously it is
abused. Cf. Kendall v. Stokes, supra.

~uprtmt

aj:lturlllf tlft ~tb ~buts
'.Jiu!pngton, ~. <lJ. 2llp'1~

CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

May 30, 1984
Re:

No. 83-490

Davis v. Scherer

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

~
Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

.:§ttJtttmt <!.Jttnrlttf tlrt ~th .:§tattg

Jlaglting±ttn. ~. <!.J. 2ll~J!.~
CHAMB ER S OF

June 4' 1984

J USTI C E BY RO N R . WH IT E

Re:

83-490 - Davis v. Scherer

Dear Lewis,
I agree.

Sincerely,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
cpm

,jnprtmt <!fcnrl cf flrt ~b Jttdt~

JfuJringtcn. ~.OJ.

2llgt'!~

C HAMBERS OF

JUSTICE

w. . . J .

BRENNAN, JR.

June 4, 1984

No. 83-490
Davis v . Scherer

Dear Lewis :
I 1 rn still not able to join you in
this.

I'll try my hand at a dissent in

due course .
Sincerely ,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Co nference

.§upumt Qf!turl ltf tlrt ~itt~ .§tattg
....-.£rhtgfun. ~. <If. 2l1.;t'1~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

,June 4, 1984

Re:

83-490 - Davis v. Scherer

Dear Lewis:
I shall await the dissent.
Respectfully ,

,1

JL
Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

~uvttuu <lf~mt ~f tqt ~th ~btttg

'IJagJringwn. ~. <!f.

2llbi'!&t

CHAMBERS OF

..JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

June 4, 1984

Re:

No. 83-490-Davis v . . Scherer

Dear Lewis:
I await the dissent.
Sincerely,

~·

.

T.M.

Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

.iu.p:rnnt ~4lltrlltf tqt ~~ .itatts
~asltinght~ ~.
CHAMBERS OF

2!1~~$

June 19, 1984

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

Re:

<!f.

83-490 - Davis v. Scherer

Dear Lewis:
I join.
Regards,

l

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

I

~upuuu

<!fo-u:rt o-f t!rt ~h ~ta±ttt
'mattfrhtgLm. ~. Of. 2ll~J.I.~

CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

June 21, 1984

Re:

No. 83-490-Davis v. Scherer

Dear Bill:
Please join me in your opinion concurring in
part and dissenting in part.
Sincerely,

tft« .
T.M.

Justice Brennan
cc:

The Conference

Jnvrtntt Q}llttrt cf tqt 'Jnittb ,jtatt.s'
'~lht~ltittgtcn, ~.

Q}.

2llbi~.;l

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O' CONNOR

June 21, 1984

Re:

No. 83-490

Davis v. Scherer

Dear Lewis,
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

.-uprmu Clf&tUrl ttf ~ ~
~-Jrhtghtn, ~.

elf.

,httt•

21lgf'!~

CHAMI!IERS OF"

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

June 22, 1984

Re:

83-490 - Davis v. Scherer

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
:Respectfully,

/~t._
Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

.:%u.pumc <!fourt o-f tJtt ~ttittb ;%tatts
~~s!pngton. ~.

cq.

2!lp'!.;l ,

CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

June 22, 1984

Re: No. 83-490 - Davis v. Scherer
Dear Bill:
Please join me in your dissent.
Sincerely,

/4

-------

Justice Brennan
cc: The Conference

"'

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor

06/22

From:

Justice Powell

Circulated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Recirculated:

2nd DRAFT

,

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 83-490
RALPH DAVIS, ETC., ET AL. v.
GREGORY SCOTT SCHERER

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
(June-, 1984]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellants in this case challenge the holding of the Court of
Appeals that a state official loses his qualified immunity from
suit for deprivation of federal constitutional rights if he is
found to have violated the clear command of a state administrative regulation.
I
The present controversy arose when appellee Gregory
Scherer, who was employed by the Florida Highway Patrol
as a radio-teletype operator, applied for permission from the
Patrol to work as well for the Escambia County Sheriff's Office as a reserve deputy. To avoid conflicts of interest, an
order of the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles required that proposed outside employment of
Patrol members be approved by the Department. A letter
from appellee's troop commander Captain K. S. Sconiers,
dated September 1, 1977, granted appellee permission to accept the part-time work. The letter noted that permission
would be rescinded "should [the] employment interfere ...
with your duties with [the] department." App. to Juris.
Statement 5a. Later that month, Capt. Sconiers informed
appellee by memorandum that permission to accept the employment was revoked. As Capt. Sconiers explained at
trial, his superiors in the Highway Patrol had determined
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that appellee's reserve deputy duties could conflict with his
duties at the Highway Patrol.
Appellee continued to work at the second job, despite the
revocation of permission. Oral discussions and an exchange
of letters among appellee and his superiors ensued. Sgt.
Clark, appellee's immediate superior, advised appellee that
he was violating instructions; appellee explained that he had
invested too much money in uniforms to give up his part-time
work. Lt. Wiggins, the next highest officer in the chain of
command, then orally and by memorandum ordered appellee
to quit his part-time job. Appellee explained to Lt. Wiggins
that he saw no conflict between the two jobs and would not
quit his second job.
Sgt. Clark and Lt. Wiggins had submitted memoranda to
Capt. Sconiers that described appellee's continued employment and their conversations with appellee. Appellee also
wrote to Capt. Sconiers explaining that he saw no reason to
resign his outside employment. So advised, Capt. Sconiers
recommended to Col. J. E. Beach, director of the Florida
Highway Patrol, that appellee be suspended for three days
for violation of the dual-employment policy. Capt. Sconiers
submitted a number of documents, including his own letters
approving appellee's request and rescinding the approval; appellee's letter of request and subsequent letter explaining his
refusal to quit his job; and the memoranda of Sgt. Clark and
Lt. Wiggins. 1 On the basis of these documents, Col. Beach
on October 24, 1977, ordered that appellee's employment
with the Florida Highway Patrol be terminated.
On November 10, 1977, appellee filed an appeal with the
Florida Career Service Commission. Before the Commission had heard appellee's administrative appeal from his dismissal, appellee and the Department settled the dispute.
One memorandum reported to Capt. Sconiers that appellee had continued to work at his second job; a second had been addressed by Lt. Wiggins
to appellee; other memoranda summarized Lt. Wiggins' and Sgt. Clark's
discussions with appellee.
1
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The settlement reinstated appellee with back pay. But friction between appellee and his superiors continued, and in
January 1979, after appellee was suspended from the Patrol,
he resigned "to avoid further harassment and to remove a
cloud over his employability. " App. to Juris. Statement 23a.
Appellee then filed the present suit against appellants in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Florida, seeking relief under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. 2 Appellee's
complaint alleged that appellants in 1977 had violated the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by discharging
appellee from his job without a formal pretermination or a
prompt post-termination hearing.3 Appellee requested a
declaration that his rights had been violated and an award of
money damages.
The District Court granted the requested relief for violation of appellee's Fourteenth Amendment rights. 4 The
court found that appellee had a property interest in his job
and that the procedures followed by appellants to discharge
appellee were constitutionally "inadequate" under the Fourteenth Amendment. App.to Juris. Statement 35a. Further, the court declared unconstitutional Florida's statutory
provisions governing removal of state employees, Fla. Stat.
§ 110.061 (1977). Finally, the District Court concluded that
appellants had forfeited their qualified immunity from suit
under § 1983 because appellee's "due process rights were
2
Appellant Ralph Davis was Executive Director of the Department of
Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles at the time of appellee's discharge
from employment. Appellant Chester Blakemore succeeded Davis to that
position and is a party only in his official capacity. Appellant Colonel J.
Eldridge Beach is Director of the Florida Highway Patrol, a division of the
Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles; as noted above, he
held that position at the time of appellee's discharge.
'The complaint also alleged that appellants, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, had coerced appellee to accept an inadequate settlement and had infringed upon appellee's the right of privacy guaranteed by
the First and Ninth Amendments.
• The District Court rejected appellee's other constitutional claims.
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clearly established at the time of his October 24, 1977 dismissal." App. to Juris. Statement 46a.
Five days after entry of the District Court's order, the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided Weisbrod v.
Donigan, 651 F. 2d 334 (1981).
The Court of Appeals there
held that Florida officials in 1978 had violated no well established due process rights in discharging a permanent state
employee without a pre-termination or a prompt post-termination hearing. On motion for reconsideration, the District
Court found that Weisbrod required it to vacate its prior
holding that appellants had forfeited their immunity by violating appellee's clearly established constitutional rights.
The court nevertheless reaffirmed its award of monetary
damages. It reasoned that proof that an official had violated
clearly established constitutional rights was not the "sole
way" to overcome the official's claim of qualified immunity.
Applying the "totality of the circumstances" test of Scheuer
v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 247-248 (1974), the District Court
held that "if an official violates his agency's explicit regulations, which have the force of state law, [that] is evidence
that his conduct is unreasonable." App. to Juris. Statement
68a. 5 In this respect, the court noted that the personnel
regulations of the Florida Highway Patrol clearly required "a
complete investigation of the charge and an opportunity [for
the employee] to respond in writing." Id., at 70a. 6 The
The District Court relied in part on the reasoning of Williams v.
Treen, 671 F. 2d 892 (CA5 1982), cert denied,- U. S . - (1983), that
had held that official conduct in violation of an explicit and clearly established state regulation was per se unreasonable. Id., at 899.
• These rules specified in pertinent part:
Upon receiving a report of ... a violation of Department or Division rules
and regulations ... , the Director shall order a complete investigation to
determine the true facts concerning the circumstances surrounding the alleged offense. The completed investigation report will also contain a written statement made by the employee against whom the complaint was
made. If after a thorough study of all information concerning the violation, the Director decides that a ... dismissal will be in order, he will
6
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District Court concluded that appellants in discharging appellee had "followed procedures contrary to the department's
rules and regulations"; therefore, appellants were "not entitled to qualified immunity because their belief in the legality
of the challenged conduct was unreasonable." Ibid. The
court explicitly relied upon the official violation of the personnel rule, stating that "if [the] departmental order had not
been adopted ... prior to [appellee's] dismissal, no damages
of any kind could be awarded." Ibid. The District Court's
order amending the judgment did not discuss the issue
whether appellants violated appellee's federal constitutional
rights. On that issue, the District Court relied upon its previous opinion; the court did not indicate that the personnel
regulation was relevant to its analysis of appellee's rights
under the due process clause.
The District Court also amended its judgment declaring
the Florida civil service statute unconstitutional. The
State's motion for reconsideration had informed the court
that the statute had been repealed by the Florida legislature.
The District Court therefore declared unconstitutional the
provisions of the newly enacted civil service statute, Fla.
Stat. ch. 110 (1981), "insofar as they fail to provide a prompt
post-termination hearing." App. to Juris. Statement 80a.
The Court of Appeals affirmed on the basis of the District
Court's opinion. We noted probable jurisdiction,-- U. S.
- - (1983), to consider whether the Court of Appeals properly had declared the Florida statute unconstitutional and denied appellants' claim of qualified immunity. Appellants do
not seek review of the District Court's finding that appellee's
constitutional rights were violated. As appellee now concedes that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate
the constitutionality of the Florida statute enacted in 1981,
present the employee in writing with the reason or reasons for such
actions.
General Order No. 43 § l.C (September 1, 1977), quoted at J. S. App. 69a.
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we consider only the issue of qualified immunity. 7
reverse.
II

We

In the present posture of this case, the District Court's decision that appellants violated appellee's rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment is undisputed. 8 This finding of the
District Court-based entirely upon federal constitutional
law-resolves the merits of appellee's underlying claim for
relief under§ 1983. It does not, however, decide the issue of
damages. Even defendants who violate constitutional rights
enjoy a qualified immunity that protects them from liability
for damages unless it is further demonstrated that their conduct was unreasonable under the applicable standard. The
precise standard for determining when an official may assert
the qualified immunity defense has been clarified by recent
cases, see Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308 (1975); Butz v.
Economou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U. S. 800 (1982). The present case requires us to consider
the application of the standard where the official's conduct violated a state regulation as well as a provision of the federal
Constitution.
7

The Florida civil service statute now in force replaced the statute
under which appellee's employment was terminated.
As the current
State statute was never applied to appellee, he lacks standing to question
its constitutionality. Cf. Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U. S. 103 (1969).
Appellee's concession does not deprive the Court of appellate jurisdiction
over the remaining issue in the case. In cases where the Court of Appeals
has declared a state statute unconsitutional, this Court may decide the
"Federal questions presented," 28 U. S. C. § 1254(2). Cf. Flournoy v.
Wiener, 321 U. S. 253, 263 (1944); Leroy v. Great Western United Corp.,
443 U. S. 173 (1979). Under§ 1254(2), the Court retains discretion to decline to consider those issues in the case not related to the declaration that
the State statute is invalid. In the present case, however, we choose to
consider the important question whether the District Court and the Court
of Appeals properly denied appellants' good faith immunity from suit.
8
As we discuss below, it is contested whether these constitutional
rights were clearly established at the time of appellants' conduct.
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The District Court's analysis of appellants' qualified immunity, written before our decision in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
supra, rests upon the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding appellee's separation from his job. This Court applied that standard in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S., at
247-248.
As subsequent cases recognized, Wood v.
Strickland, supra, at 322, the "totality of the circumstances"
test comprised two separate inquiries: an inquiry into the objective reasonableness of the defendant official's conduct in
light of the governing law, and an inquiry into the official's
subjective state of mind. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, supra, rejected the inquiry into state of mind in favor of a wholly objective standard. Under Harlow, officials "are shielded
from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have lmown." 457
U. S., at 818. Whether an official may prevail in his qualified immunity defense depends upon the "objective reasonableness of [his] conduct as measured by reference to clearly
established law." ld. (footnote deleted). No other "circumstances" are relevant to the issue of qualified immunity.
Appellee suggests, however, that the District Court judgment can be reconciled with Harlow in two ways. First, appellee urges that the record evinces a violation of constitutional rights that were clearly established. Second, in
appellee's view, the District Court correctly found that, absent a violation of clearly established constitutional rights,
appellants' violation of the state administrative regulationalthough irrelevant to the merits of appellee's underlying
constitutional claim-was decisive of the qualified immunity
question. In our view, neither submission is consistent with
our prior cases.
A
Appellee contends that the District Court's reliance in its
qualified immunity analysis upon the state regulation was
"superfluous," Brief for Appellee 19, because the federal con-
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stitutional right to a pre-termination or a prompt post-termination hearing was well established in the Fifth Circuit at the
time of the conduct in question. As the District Court recognized in rejecting appellee's contention, Weisbrod v.
Donigan, 651 F. 2d 334 (CA5 1981), is authoritative
precedent to the contrary. The Court of Appeals in that
case found that the State had violated no clearly established
due process right when it discharged a civil service employee
9
\ without any pretermination hearing.
Nor was it unreasonable· in this case, under Fourteenth
Amendment due process principles, for the Department to
conclude that appellee had been provided with the funda' mentals of due process. 10 As stated above, the District
Court found that appellee was informed several times of the
Department's objection to his second employment and took
advantage of several opportunities to present his reasons for
believing that he should be permitted to retain his part-time
employment despite the contrary rules of the Patrol. Appel;

\

'We see no reason to doubt, as does the dissent, that the Court of Appeals in Weisbrod had full knowledge of its own precedents and correctly
construed them.
10
As the dissent explains at some length, the decisions of this Court by
1978 had required "some kind of a hearing," Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U. S. 564, 570 n. 7 (1972), prior to discharge of an employee who had a constitutionally protected property interest in his employment. But the
Court had not determined what kind of a hearing must be provided. Such
a determination would require a careful balancing of the competing interests-of the employee and the State-implicated in the official decision at
issue. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335 q976). As the Court
had considered circumstances in which no hearing at all had been provided
prior to termination, Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U. S. 593 (1972), or in which
the requirements of due process were met, Board of Regents v. Roth,
supra; Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134 (1974); Bislwp v. Wood, 426 U . S.
341 (1976); Codd v. Velger, 429 U. S. 274 (1977), there had been no occasion
to specify any minimally acceptable procedures for termination of employment. The dissent cites no case establishing that appellee was entitled to
more elaborate notice, or a more formal opportunity to respond, than he in
fact received.
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lee's statement of reasons and other relevant information
were before the senior official who made the decision to discharge appellee. And Florida law provided for a full evidentiary hearing after termination. We conclude that the District Court correctly held that appellee has demonstrated no
violation of his clea'riy established constitutional rights.
B

Appellee's second ground for affirmance in substance is
that upon which the District Court relied. Appellee submits
that appellants, by failing to comply with a clear state regulation, forfeited their qualified immunity from suit for violation
of federal constitutional rights.
Appellee makes no claim that the appellants' violation of
the state regulation either is itself actionable under§ 1983 or
bears upon the claim of constitutional right that appellee asserts under§ 1983. 11 And appellee also recognizes that Harlow v. Fitzgerald makes immunity available only to officials
whose conduct conforms to a standard of "objective legal
reasonableness." 457 U. S., at 819. Nonetheless, in appellee's view, official conduct that contravenes a statute or regulation is not "objectively reasonable" because officials fairly
may be expected to conform their conduct to such legal
norms. Appellee also argues that the lawfulness of official
conduct under such a statute or regulation may be determined early in the lawsuit on motion for summary judgment.
Appellee urges therefore that a defendant official's violation
of a clear statute or regulation, although not itself the basis of
suit, should deprive the official of qualified immunity from
11
State law may bear upon a claim under the due process clause when the
property interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment are created
by state law. See Board of Regents v. Roth, supra, at 577. Appellee's
property interest in his job under Florida law is undisputed. Appellee
does not contend here that the procedural rules in state law govern the
constitutional analysis of what process was due to him under the Fourteenth Amendment.

·,

83-490-DPINION
10

DAVIS v. SCHERER

damages for violation of other statutory or constitutional
provisions.
On its face, appellee's reasoning is not without some force.
We decline, however, to adopt it. Even before Harlow, our
cases had made clear that, under the "objective" component
of the good faith immunity test, "an official would not be held
liable in damages under§ 1983 unless the constitutional right
he was alleged to have violated was 'clearly established' at the
time of the violation." Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478,
498 (1978) (emphasis added); accord, Procunier v. Navarette,
434 U. S. 555, 562 (1978). Officials sued for constitutional
violations do not lose their qualified immunity merely because their conduct violates some statutory or administrative
provision. 12
1.2 In Harlow, the Court aclrnowledged that officials may lose their immunity by violating "clearly established statutory ... rights." 457 U. S., at
818. This is the case where the plaintiff seeks to recover damages for violation of those statutory rights, as in Harlow itself, see id. , at 820 n. 36,
and as in many § 1983 suits, see, e. g., Maine v. Thiboutot , 448 U. S. 1
(1980) (holding that § 1983 creates cause of action against state officials for
violating federal statutes). For the reasons that we discuss , officials sued
for violations of rights conferred by a statute or regulation, like officials
sued for violation of constitutional rights, do not forfeit their immunity by
violating some other statute or regulation. Rather, these officials become
liable for damages only to the extent that there is a clear violation of the
statutory rights that give rise to the cause of action for damages. And if a
statute or regulation does give rise to a cause of action for damages, clear
violation of the statute or regulation forfeits immunity only with respect to
damages caused by that violation. In the present case, as we have noted,
there is no claim that the state regulation itself or the laws that authorized
its promulgation create a cause of action for damages or provide the basis
for an action brought under § 1983.
Harlow was a suit against federal, not state, officials. But our cases
have recognized that the same qualified immunity rules apply in suits
against state officers under § 1983 and in suits against federal officers
under Bivens v. Six Unknawn Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388
(1971). See Butz v. Economou, supra, at 504. Neither federal nor state
officials lose their immunity by violating the clear command of a statute or
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We acknowledge of course that officials should conform
their conduct to applicable statutes and regulations. For
that reason, it is an appealing proposition that the violation of
such provisions is a circumstance relevant to the official's
claim of qualified immunity. But in determining what circumstances a court may consider in deciding claims of qualified immunity, we choose "between the evils inevitable in any
available alternative." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, supra, at
813-814. Appellee's submission, if adopted, would disrupt
the balance that our cases strike between the interests in vindication of citizens' constitutional rights and in public officials'
effective performance of their duties. The qualified immunity doctrine recognizes that officials can act without fear of
harassing litigation only if they reasonably can anticipate
when their conduct may give rise to liability for damages and
only if unjustified lawsuits are quickly terminated. See Butz
v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 506-507 (1978); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 814, 818-819. Yet, under appellee's
submission, officials would be liable in indeterminate amount
for violation of any constitutional right-one that was not
clearly defined or perhaps not even foreshadowed at the time
of the alleged violation-merely because their official conduct
also violated some statute or regulation. And, in § 1983
suits, the issue whether an official enjoyed qualified immunity then might depend upon the meaning or purpose of a
state administrative regulation, questions that federal judges
often may be unable to resolve on summary judgment.
Appellee proposes that his new rule for qualified immunity
be limited by requiring that plaintiffs allege clear violation of
a statute or regulation that advanced important interests or
was designed to protect constitutional rights. Yet, once the
door is opened to such inquiries, it is difficult to limit their
scope in any principled manner. Federal judges would be
granted large discretion to extract from various statutory
regulatio~f

federal or of state law-unless that statute or regulation
provides the basis for the cause of action sued upon.
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and administrative codes those provisions that seem to them
sufficiently clear or important to warrant denial of qualified
immunity. And such judgments fairly could be made only
after an extensive inquiry into whether the official in the circumstances of his decision should have appreciated the applicability and importance of the rule at issue. It would become more difficult, not only for officials to anticipate the
possible legal consequences of their conduct, 13 but also for
trial courts to decide even frivolous suits without protracted
litigation.
Nor is it always fair, or sound policy, to demand official
compliance with statute and regulation on pain of money
damages. Such officials as police officers or prison wardens,
to say nothing of higher-level executive levels who enjoy only
qualified immunity, routinely make close decisions in the exercise of the broad authority that necessarily is delegated to
them. These officials are subject to a plethora of rules,
"often so voluminous, ambiguous, and contradictory, and in
such flux that officials can comply with them only selectively." See P. Schuck, Suing Government 66 (1983). In
these circumstances, officials should not err always on the
side of caution. "[O]fficials with a broad range of duties and
authority must often act swiftly and firmly at the risk that
action deferred will be futile or constitute virtual abdication
of office." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S., at 246. 14
18
Officials would be required not only to know the applicable regulations,
but also to understand the intent with which each regulation was adopted.
Such an understanding often eludes even trained lawyers with full access
to the relevant legislative or administrative materials. It is unfair and impracticable to require such an understanding of public officials generally.
,. Appellee urges as well that appellants' violation of the personnel regulation constituted breach of their ''ministerial" duty-established by the
regulation-to follow various procedures before terminating appellee's employment. Although the decision to discharge an employee clearly is discretionary, appellee reasons that the Highway Patrol regulation deprived
appellants of all discretion in determining what procedures were to be followed prior to discharge. Under this view, the Harlow standard is inap-
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III
A plaintiff who seeks damages for violation of constitutional or statutory rights may overcome the defendant official's qualified immunity only by showing that those rights
were clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue.
As appellee has made no such showing, the judgment of the
Court of Appeals is reversed and the case remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

posite because this Court's doctrine grants qualified immunity to officials in
the performance of discretionary, but not ministerial, functions.
Appellee's contention mistakes the scope of the ''ministerial duty" exception to qualified immunity in two respects. First, as we have discussed,
breach of a legal duty created by the personnel regulation would forfeit official immunity only if that breach itself gave rise to the appellee's cause of
action for damages. This principle equally applies whether the regulation
created discretionary or ministerial duties. Even if the personnel regulation did create a ministerial duty, appellee makes no claim that he is entitled to damages simply because the regulation was violated. See pp. 8-10
and note 11, supra.
In any event, the rules that purportedly established appellants' "ministerial" duties in the present case left to appellants a substantial measure of
discretion. Cf. Amy v. The Supervisors, 78 U. S. 136, 138 (1870); Kendall
v. Stokes, 44 U. S. 87, 98 (1845). Appellants were to determine, for example, what constituted a "complete investigation" and a ''thorough study of
all information" sufficient to justify a decision to terminate appellee's employment. See note 6, supra. And the District Court's finding that appellants ignored a clear legal command does not bear on the ''ministerial"
nature of appellants' duties. A law that fails to specify the precise action
that the official must take in each instance creates only discretionary authority; and that authority remains discretionary however egregiously it is
abused. Cf. Kendall v. Stokes, supra.
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Appellee, formerly an employee of the Florida
Highway Patrol, brought this §1983 action against
appellants, officers of the Patrol.

Be alleged that
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required by the due process clause.
The present appeal presents only the questio, ;
whether appellants enjoy qualified immunity/ from suit for
damages under the standard of "objective reasonableness•
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enunciated in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, -4§7
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899A.(1982).

The District Court found that appellants had
violated no clear1~4stablished constitutional rights~of
appellee.
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Nonetheless, it held that appellants had
their immunity/ because their conduct had violated

an administrative regulation.

The Court of Appeals for the

11th Circuit affirmed without opinion.
A §1983 plaintiff, seeking damages for an alleged
violation of constitutional or statutory rights, must show
that those rights were clearly establishe~at the time of
the conduct at issue.

This is the objective standard of
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Harlow v. Fitzgerald.
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society's interest in vindicating the constitutional rights
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of citizens,~and its interest in assuring that public
officials are free to perform their
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violation of then clearly established rights.)
We agree with the courts below that appellants
violated no clearly established constitutional or statutory
rights.
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ButAthey erred in then relying

sol~!f

on a state

administrative regulation to impose liability.
Accordingly we reverse the judgment of the Court
of Appeals,~and remand for further proceedings consistent
with our opinon.
Justice Brennan has filed a dissenting opinion / in
which Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens have joined.
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